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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,   ) 
     ) NO. 43952 
 Plaintiff-Respondent, )  
     ) ADA COUNTY NO. CR 2014-8846 
v.     ) 
     ) 
TAYLOR CARL BENEDICT, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
     ) 
 Defendant-Appellant. ) 
___________________________) 
 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 The district court recognized that Taylor Benedict had been making progress 
while on probation:  
I’m really proud of how well you did.  I really am.  I mean, your risk 
to recidivate, your numbers are so high that the deck has been stacked 
against you.  And one by one, you have been putting those cards aside.  
And I know when you go to prison, you’re going to continue to do that.   
I’m really encouraged by how honest you’ve been this morning and 
taking responsibility for what you did. 
 
(Tr., p.14, Ls.16-25.)  And yet, despite acknowledging Mr. Benedict’s efforts, it refused 
to, pursuant to his I.C.R. 35 motion (hereinafter, Rule 35), reduce the fixed portion of his 
sentence so that he would be immediately parole-eligible in this case.  Given all the 
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mitigating factors the district court recognized, its decision failed to address all the goals 
of sentencing, and so, constituted an abuse of its discretion.  Therefore, this Court 
should reduce Mr. Benedict’s sentence as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively, 
remand this case to the district court for a new disposition determination. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 Mr. Benedict was working to get himself established on probation in this case 
following a successful period of retained jurisdiction.  (See Presentence Investigation 
Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.24 (the rider staff recommending probation).)  One of the 
problems he faced was that, due to extended periods of prior incarceration, 
Mr. Benedict had limited job skills.  (PSI, p.13; see PSI, pp.4-8, 19 (noting that the 
underlying charge for possession of methamphetamine was at least Mr. Benedict’s fifth 
felony conviction).)  Therefore, to help facilitate his transition to probation, the district 
court was holding weekly review hearings.  (See R., pp.144-47.)   
Mr. Benedict had been showing progress in those hearings.  (Tr., p.11, 
Ls.11-18.)  For example, he had been getting temporary jobs through one temp agency 
and had several applications pending with other potential employers.  (R., p.145.)  He 
had been attending support meetings as part of his ordered ninety meetings in ninety 
days.  (Tr., p.11, Ls.15-18; see R., p.140 (listing the terms of Mr. Benedict’s probation).)  
The district court commended his efforts during that period:  “I’m really proud of how 
well you did.  I really am.  I mean, your risk to recidivate, your numbers are so high that 
the deck has been stacked against you.  And one by one, you have been putting those 
cards aside.”  (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-21.) 
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 However, several weeks in, Mr. Benedict experienced a relapse.  He admitted 
that, during that relapse, he had been in possession of a stolen truck.1  (Tr., p.9, L.19 - 
p.10, L.4.)  He recognized, “I squandered a great opportunity, and I violated my 
probation by picking up not only just a new crime, but a felony crime.  So I want to 
accept responsibility fully for not only my actions in my old – the old case with – that’s in 
front of you on probation, but the new case as well.”  (Tr., p.7, L.23 - p.8, L.3.)  
Mr. Benedict also realized what the consequences of his actions would be:  “I just want 
to get on with it, pay my debt to society the best I can . . . . And the only way I can do 
that is by going to prison and doing what needs to be done.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.4-11.)  He 
expressed his intent to try and get into the work center so he could pay off the restitution 
he still owed.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.7-9.)  He apologized to the district court, “because I didn’t 
honor my word to you.  And I had all intentions of doing that, but I didn’t do that, is the 
bottom line.  And so I sincerely apologize.”  (Tr., p.8, Ls.13-16.) 
 Given Mr. Benedict’s efforts on probation and his decision to immediately accept 
responsibility for his actions, defense counsel asked the district court, pursuant to Rule 
35, to “give him some relief on the fixed time, perhaps three years down to one and a 
half,” on his underlying sentence.  (Tr., p.12, Ls.1-5.)  Defense counsel explained that 
was appropriate, in part, because Mr. Benedict’s actions “show[] a level of maturity . . . . 
                                            
1 Other allegations relating to other new charges were dismissed as part of the 
agreement for Mr. Benedict’s admission to the allegation of probation violation.  
(See Tr., p.5, Ls.13-23; R., pp.159-61.)  At the time of the admit/deny hearing, 
Mr. Benedict had already pled guilty to the new charge grand theft before a different 
judge in a newly-filed case.  (Tr., p.5, Ls.13-15.)  As the judge in the new case had 
expedited the sentencing hearing in that case, defense counsel requested the district 
court proceed to disposition that same day in the instant case.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.2-18.) 
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I think that shows some growth as well.  He knows that he messed up.  And he’s 
coming before this court and taking full responsibility for it.”  (Tr., p.11, Ls.3-10.)   
 The district court commended Mr. Benedict on his efforts during his period of 
probation.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-25.)  It also expressed its hope for Mr. Benedict to continue 
his rehabilitative efforts:  “I know when you go to prison, you’re going to continue to do 
that. . . . So I hope when you do get out, because it is a matter of time before you get 
out, that you’re able to get more time, money, and tools underneath you so you can do 
well on parole.”  (Tr., p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.3.)  However, it did not reduce his sentence, 
noting that he would be receiving credit for time served in excess of one and one-half 
years.2  (Tr., p.14, Ls.7-8.)  Instead, it executed his underlying sentence of seven years, 
with three years fixed, without modification.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.2-6; R., pp.183-85.)  
Mr. Benedict filed a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.187-88.) 
 
ISSUE 
Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to reduce Mr. Benedict’s 
sentence when it revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence. 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Refusing To Reduce Mr. Benedict’s 
Sentence When It Revoked His Probation And Executed His Underlying Sentence 
 
When the district court is executing a previously-pronounced sentence, it may 
reduce that sentence pursuant to Rule 35.  See, e.g., State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779.  
                                            
2 The district court subsequently calculated Mr. Benedict was entitled to credit for 511 
days of time served.  (R., p.184.) 
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The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on 
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court’s discretion.  State v. Hanington, 
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009).  The standard of review and factors considered in 
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing.  Id. 
The factors, or objectives, considered at sentencing are:  (1) protection of 
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of 
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing.  Id.  The protection of 
society is the primary objective the court should consider.  State v. Charboneau, 124 
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).  A sentence that protects society and also accomplishes the 
other objectives will be considered reasonable.  Id.; State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568 
(Ct. App. 1982).  This is because the protection of society is influenced by each of the 
other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in sentencing.  Charboneau, 
124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.  However, the Idaho Supreme Court has also held 
that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial consideration in the imposition of the 
criminal sanction.”  State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded on other 
grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015). 
In this case, the district court indicated it would not grant Mr. Benedict’s request 
for leniency pursuant to Rule 35 because doing so would make him immediately parole 
eligible.3  (See Tr., p.14, Ls.7-8.)  However, the parole board retains discretion over 
whether or not to grant parole.  See, e.g., State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931 (2005).  
                                            
3 There was no express ruling on Mr. Benedict’s Rule 35 motion.  (See generally Tr.)  
However, the fact that his sentence was executed without modification makes it clear 
that the district court was not granting the motion.  The only reason the district court 
gave for its decision, despite Mr. Benedict’s progress, was the fact that he was entitled 
to credit for time served.  (See generally Tr.) 
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That means, even though the reduced sentence would have made Mr. Benedict 
immediately parole-eligible, the parole board would not necessarily have immediately 
released Mr. Benedict.4  As a result, the district court’s decision to reject the Rule 35 
was based on a hypothetical decision the parole board might or might not make.  That is 
not a proper basis to reject such a motion. 
Rather, it represents a failure to sufficiently consider the mitigating facts in the 
case before it.  As the district court, itself, pointed out, Mr. Benedict had made 
significant strides in his time on probation following his successful period of retained 
jurisdiction.  (Tr., p.14, Ls.16-25.)  Despite all the issues that had plagued his past, he 
was making progress; “one by one, you have been putting those cards aside.”  
(Tr., p.14, Ls.20-21.)  Therefore, on the facts of this case, Mr. Benedict had 
demonstrated not only amenability to treatment and rehabilitative potential, but also, a 
more mature understanding of the expectations set for him, the consequences for not 
meeting those expectations, and acceptance of responsibility for falling short of those 
expectations.  (See, e.g., Tr., p.11, Ls.3-10.)   
All of these facts demonstrate that rehabilitation, as one of the four sentencing 
objectives, and indeed, as the initial factor which should be considered in making 
sentencing decisions, McCoy, 94 Idaho at 240, was still a distinct possibility in 
Mr. Benedict’s case.  The failure to reduce his sentence in recognition of his continuing 
rehabilitative potential only serves to delay continued efforts at rehabilitation.  As the 
                                            
4 Any parole decision would, as a practical matter, also depend on what the other judge 
did in the new case.  However, the judge in the instant case was only set to determine 
the proper sentence based on the facts of the case before it.  See, e.g., 
State v. Findeisen, 133 Idaho 228, 229 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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district court noted, it expected Mr. Benedict to pursue options while in prison.  
(Tr., p.14, Ls.21-22.)  For example, Mr. Benedict hoped to be placed in the work center 
(Tr., p.8, Ls.7-9), but such placement was not guaranteed.  As such, the district court’s 
hope for continued rehabilitation was ultimately set on Mr. Benedict’s ability to get back 
on his feet while on parole.  (Tr., p.14, L.25 - p.15, L.3.)  But the district court’s decision 
to reject Mr. Benedict’s Rule 35 delayed the opportunity for parole.  See, e.g., State v. 
Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953) (recognizing timing of rehabilitative programming is an 
important consideration at sentencing), overruled on other grounds by 
State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971); Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489 
(Ct. App. 2008) (same). 
Thus, by rejecting the opportunity to set Mr. Benedict up to timely continue his 
rehabilitation efforts in this case, a decision the parole board is well-situated to make if 
Mr. Benedict’s sentence were modified to make him immediately parole-eligible, the 
district court failed to sufficiently consider all the goals of sentencing when it revoked 
Mr. Benedict’s probation.  As a result, it abused its discretion in this case by not 
reducing the fixed period of Mr. Benedict’s sentence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Benedict respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate.  Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 DATED this 31st day of May, 2016. 
      _________/s/____________________ 
      BRIAN R. DICKSON 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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